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In the period 1992–2000, the Public Health Laboratory Ser-
vice Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre collected
standardized epidemiologic data on 1,877 general outbreaks of
Norovirus (formerly “Norwalk-like virus”) infection in England
and Wales. Seventy-nine percent of general outbreaks
occurred in health-care institutions, i.e., hospitals (40%) and
residential-care facilities (39%). When compared with out-
breaks in other settings, those in health-care institutions were
unique in exhibiting a winter peak (p<0.0001); these outbreaks
were also associated with significantly higher death rates and
prolonged duration but were smaller in size and less likely to be
foodborne. These data suggest that Norovirus infection has
considerable impact on the health service and the vulnerable
populations residing in institutions such as hospitals and resi-
dential homes. A distinct outbreak pattern in health-care institu-
tions suggests a combination of host, virologic, and
environmental factors that mediate these divergent epidemio-
logic patterns.
ecent population-based studies have shown that Norovi-
ruses ([NVs] formal name: Norovirus; formerly “Nor-
walk-like viruses”) are the most commonly identified cause of
infectious intestinal diseases in Western European communi-
ties (1,2). These viruses account for an estimated 6% and 11%
of all infectious intestinal diseases in England and the Nether-
lands, respectively (1,2) and for an estimated 23 million cases
of NV in the United States each year (3). NVs are also the
most common cause of outbreaks of infectious intestinal dis-
eases in Western Europe and North America (3–7).
Three factors contribute to the considerable impact of dis-
ease caused by NV: a large human reservoir of infection (2,8),
a very low infectious dose (9), and the ability to be transmitted
by a variety of routes. Person-to-person spread by means of
the fecal-oral route or aerosol formation after projectile vomit-
ing is the most commonly recognized mode of transmission
(4,10), although foodborne (3,11) and waterborne (12–14)
transmission are also well documented.  
Gastroenteritis caused by NV is mild and self-limiting in
the absence of other factors. Kaplan et al. and others have pro-
posed that NV outbreaks can be recognized on clinical symp-
toms (short duration and incubation) and epidemiology (high
attack rates and high frequency of vomiting) alone (4,15–17).
Unlike rotavirus, NVs affect all age groups (2,8) The highest
incidence is in children <5 years of age (2,18), but the greatest
impact of NV is probably an economic one among the elderly
in health-care institutions (4,6,19,20). 
We describe the epidemiology of NVs in different outbreak
settings. The data we present were collected by routine sur-
veillance of general outbreaks of infectious intestinal diseases
in England and Wales from 1992 to 2000 (4,21). Laboratory
report surveillance of NV has been shown to be subject to a
high degree of underascertainment (8) and age bias (4). There-
fore, routine laboratory reporting of cases does not serve as a
reliable sample for illness due to NV. For this reason, we
describe only outbreak data. 
Methods
Since January 1992, the Public Health Laboratory Service
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre has operated a
standardized comprehensive surveillance system for general
outbreaks of infectious intestinal diseases (see Appendix). The
details of how this system operates are described elsewhere
(4,21). In 1995 and 1996, the Public Health Laboratory Ser-
vice instituted an active reporting program for outbreaks of
NV through the Electron Microscopy Network. Ten electron
microscopy units, representing the principal regional diagnos-
tic centers for viral gastroenteritis in England, reported to the
Centre all general outbreaks for which clinical specimens had
been submitted. These reports were then integrated into the
existing outbreak surveillance system, and standardized epide-
miologic data were sought from investigating public health
physicians. The public health physicians contacted were asked
to return completed questionnaires when investigations were
concluded. Data from these questionnaires were entered and
stored on an Epi Info 6.0 database (23).
Statistical Analysis
We used the statistical software package STATA 6.0 for
these analyses (24). Chi-square tests were used to compare
proportions, and the Student t test was used to compare means.
Data on persons affected and duration of outbreaks were
observed to follow a non-normal distribution. Therefore, a nat-
ural log transformation was performed on the persons affected
and duration of outbreak data to normalize the distribution of
variables and satisfy the normality assumption for the t test
(25). A reverse natural log transformation was then performed;
results are presented as geometric means. *Public Health Laboratory Service, London, United Kingdom
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Results
Completed outbreak questionnaires were returned for
5,241 general outbreaks occurring from January 1, 1992, to
December 31, 2000 (response rate 73%). Laboratory confir-
mation of NV was recorded for 1,877 (36%) outbreaks (Figure
1). The median number of laboratory-confirmed cases in NV
outbreaks was 2 (range 1–36). Another 731 outbreaks (14% of
all outbreaks) were suspected of being caused by viral agents;
8 outbreaks were attributed to NV plus other pathogens; these
outbreaks were excluded from these analyses.
Settings
Information on setting was available for every NV out-
break (n=1,877). The most common settings were health-care
institutions: 754 (40%) outbreaks occurred in hospitals and
724 (39%) in residential-care facilities. Information on the
type of unit affected was available for 648 (86%) of 754 hospi-
tal outbreaks and 190 (26%) of the 724 in residential-care
facilities. NV infection was centered on elderly care and geri-
atric units in 251 (39%) of 648 hospital outbreaks and 169
(89%) of 190 residential home outbreaks. A total of 147
(7.8%) outbreaks occurred in hotels, 73 (4%) occurred in
schools, and 105 (6%) were linked to food outlets (Appendix).
Seventy-four outbreaks (3.9%) occurred in other settings such
as private homes, holiday camps, and military bases.
Illness and Death
A total of 57,060 people were affected in the 1,877 NV
outbreaks. After excluding hospital outbreaks (n=711), we
recorded 128 hospitalizations (case-hospitalization rate = 33/
10,000 cases) from 52 outbreaks (mean hospitalizations per
outbreak 0.19; range 0–38). Forty-three deaths (case-fatality
rate 7.5/10,000 cases) occurred in 38 outbreaks (mean deaths
per outbreak 0.07; range 0–2); all were associated with out-
breaks in hospitals (24 deaths) and residential-care facilities
(19 deaths). 
Time Trends and Seasonality
Reports of NV outbreaks peaked in 1995 (367 outbreaks)
(Figure 1), falling to 139 outbreaks in 1997. Since then, out-
breaks have steadily increased; 281 outbreaks were reported in
2000. Since 1995, outbreaks have shown a strong seasonal
peak (Figure 1). Outbreaks begin increasing in September and
peak in the months of January, February, and March. Out-
breaks in hospitals and residential facilities occur more com-
monly in the 6 months from November to April than the rest of
the year (994/421; ratio 2.36) (Figure 2). Outbreaks in other
settings display no winter peak (189/205; ratio 0.92). This dif-
ference in the seasonality between outbreaks in health-care
institutions and those in other settings is significant (χ 2 51.1,
p<0.0001)
Mode of Transmission
The reported modes of transmission were as follows (Table
1): person to person in 1,599 (85%) outbreaks; foodborne in
93 (5%) outbreaks; foodborne followed by person-to-person
spread in 91 (5%) outbreaks; waterborne in 1 outbreak;
unknown in 92 (5%) outbreaks. 
Person-to-person spread was reported in 716 (95%) of the
754 hospital outbreaks. This figure was a significantly higher
proportion than observed in food outlets (22%; 23/105 [χ 2
551.3; p<0.0001], hotels (64%; 94/147 [χ 2 175.9; p<0.0001],
schools (89%; 65/73 [χ 2 27.6; p<0.0001]), or residential facili-
ties (91.0%; 658/723 [χ 2 13.9; p=0.0002]). Food outlets were
the only setting where foodborne transmission predominated
(67%; 70/105).
Person-to-person outbreaks occurred more commonly
from November to April than in the rest of the year (1,020/
514; ratio 1.98). Foodborne outbreaks showed a significantly
weaker seasonality (105/73; ratio 1.43) than person-to-person
outbreaks (χ 2 3.99; p=0.05).
Food Vehicles
Specific vehicles were implicated in 72 (39.1%) of the 184
NV outbreaks reported to be transmitted by food. In 12 of
these outbreaks, multiple food vehicles were reported, for a
total of 86 implicated items. A wide range of food types were
reported as vehicles of infection, including oysters, salad vege-
tables, poultry, red meat, fruit, soups, desserts, and savory
snacks. The evidence implicating these food vehicles included
Figure 1. Seasonality of all outbreaks and confirmed
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cohort studies (55%; 47/86), case-control studies (8%; 7/86),
and microbiologic studies (6%; 5/86) (Table 2). Reverse-tran-
scriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) was used to
confirm viral contamination in oysters in all five outbreaks
where microbiologic evidence was reported.
Contributory Factors
Contributory factors were reported in 113 (61%) of the 184
foodborne outbreaks. Infected food handlers were more com-
monly identified in food-related NV outbreaks (32%; 58/184)
than in those caused by other pathogens (9%; 164/1750) (χ 2
80.39; p<0.0001). Contamination by an infected food handler
was reported less frequently in outbreaks involving oysters
than other foods (oysters 0%, other foods 47%; χ 2 14.69;
p<0.0001). Cross-contamination was also reported less fre-
quently in outbreaks involving oysters than other foods (oys-
ters 5%, other foods 17%; χ 2 3.35; p=0.07).
Duration
The median duration of outbreaks was 8 days (range 1–139
days). By setting, data on the duration of outbreaks were right-
skewed since some outbreaks persisted for exceptionally long
periods. The following results are therefore presented as geo-
metric means. The duration of hospital outbreaks (8.8 days;
95% confidence intervals [CI] 8.4 to 9.3) was greater than
those in food outlets (3.3 days; 95% CI 2.8 to 3.8; t = –12.699;
p<0.0001) and hotels (4.3 days; 95% CI 3.6 to 5.1; t = –7.025;
p<0.0001). However, the duration of hospital outbreaks and
those in residential facilities did not differ significantly (8.7
days; 95% CI 8.1 to 9.4; t = –0.321; p=0.7) or schools (8.1
days; 95% CI 6.8 to 9.7; t = –0.879; p=0.4) (Table 3).
Numbers of Persons Affected
The median number of persons affected per outbreak was
21 (range 2–1,200). 
Data on the number of people affected in outbreaks were
right-skewed since a number of outbreaks were exceptionally
large. The following results are therefore presented as geomet-
ric means. The number affected in hospital outbreaks (17.5;
95% CI 16.4 to 18.5) was significantly lower than for other
settings (geometric means 21.5 to 26.5; Table 3).
Discussion
Examination of the features of NV outbreaks by setting
reveals that outbreaks in health-care facilities have a distinc-
tive epidemiologic profile. When compared with outbreaks in
other settings, those in health-care institutions were unique in
exhibiting a winter peak; they were also associated with higher
death rates and prolonged duration but were smaller in size
and were less likely to be foodborne. School outbreaks shared
some but not all of the features that characterize outbreaks in
health-care institutions. 
Several epidemiologic and biologic reasons may contrib-
ute to the divergent seasonality. The respiratory infections sea-
son, which increases activity in health-care institutions, occurs
concurrently with the peak in NV outbreaks in these facilities.
Greater admission of patients in hospitals increases both the
population at risk and the opportunities for NV to be intro-
duced. An increase in transfers of people between residential-
care facilities and hospitals also facilitates the movement of
viruses between institutions. Populations in health-care facili-
ties differ from the rest of the population in that they require
nursing care. Health-care settings are semi-closed environ-
ments where patients and residents are subject to person-to-
person spread and potentially contaminated environments.
Biologic differences between strains may also result in dif-
ferent clinical patterns. NVs from outbreaks in health-care
institutions have less genetic diversity compared with those
Table 1. Primary modes of transmission of Norovirus outbreaks, England and Wales, 1992–2000
Setting of outbreak Foodbornea Person to persona Other/unknowna Total
Hospital 10 (1.3) 716 (95.0) 28 (3.7) 754
Residential facilities 33 (4.5) 658 (91.0) 32 (4.4) 723
School 4 (5.5) 65 (89.0) 4 (5.5) 73
Food outlet  70 (66.7) 23 (21.9) 12 (11.4) 105
Hotel 42 (28.6) 94 (63.9) 11 (7.5) 147
Other 25 (33.8) 43 (58.1) 6 (8.1) 75
Total 184 (9.9) 1,599 (85.2) 93 (5.0) 1,877
aNo. of outbreaks (% of all outbreaks in setting).
Figure 2. Seasonality of Norovirus outbreaks in residential homes and
hospitals compared to all other settings, England and Wales, 1992–
2000.RESEARCH
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from other settings (26) or sporadic cases (7), and certain vari-
ants are more commonly found in health-care facilities than in
other settings (26). Thus, the strong seasonality in health-care
institutions may be the result of complex interaction between
host, pathogen, and environment. If and how these factors con-
tribute to the divergent patterns of health-care-associated and
community outbreaks are unknown, but we believe that our
findings warrant focused investigation in the UK and else-
where.
The observation that a hospitalization was associated with
1 in every 40 outbreaks and a death with 1 in every 50 out-
breaks calls into question the belief that NV gastroenteritis is a
trivial disease. Although we have no information about the
other health conditions of patients who were hospitalized or
died, these figures are generated from laboratory-confirmed
outbreaks. Previous estimates generated by Mead et al. (which
were derived from Mounts et al.) were based on the assump-
tion that NV causes a certain proportion of gastroenteritis hos-
pitalizations and deaths (11%), an assumption that was not
based on diagnostic results (3,27). 
Deaths were only reported from outbreaks in health-care
institutions. The populations in these institutions differ from
those found in other settings by virtue of their greater age or
presence of other underlying diseases. While NV infection is
not likely the principal cause of death in most cases, this infec-
tion might constitute an additional burden on patients already
weakened by other conditions and thus become an important
contributory factor. In hospital outbreaks, attack rates among
staff are similar to those among patients (4,28), suggesting that
health status is not related to acquisition of disease but to
severity of outcome. Therefore, efforts to control NV infection
should be directed towards vulnerable persons who already
require nursing care because of illness or injury. 
The only settings in which foodborne transmission pre-
dominated were food outlets. That setting was the only cate-
gory in which the purchase or consumption of food was the
Table 2. Microbiologic and statistical evidence of foods implicated in outbreaks of Norovirus, England and Wales, 1992-2000a
Implicated food Microbiologic evidence Cohort study Case-control study Any evidence
Total no. of outbreaks in which food 
vehicle implicated
Oysters 5 (25%)b 9 (45%) 0 14(70%) 20
Poultry 0 6 (67%) 0 6 (67%) 9
Meat 0 3 (60%) 0 3 (60%) 5
Fish  0  3 (50%) 1 (16%) 4 (67%) 6
Salads and vegetables 0 10 (59%) 3 (18%) 13 (76%) 17
Other items 0 16 (55%) 3 (10%) 19 (65%) 29
Total  5 (6%) 47 (55%) 7 (8%) 59 (68%) 86
aPercentages represent outbreaks with evidence per total outbreaks where food vehicle was implicated. 
aIn certain outbreaks more than one form of evidence was reported.
Table 3. Outbreak characteristics compared by setting of outbreak, England and Wales, 1992–2000
Setting Median (days) N Geometric mean of duration (days)(95% CI)a t test p value
Duration of outbreaks
Hospital 8 679 8.8 (8.4 to 9.3)
Residential facilities 9 664 8.7 (8.1 to 9.4) –0.321 0.73
School 8 63 8.1 (6.8 to 9.7) –0.879 0.40
Food outlet 3 94 3.3 (2.8 to 3.8) –12.699 <0.0001
Hotel 5 133 4.3 (3.6 to 5.1) –7.025 <0.0001
Other 4 69 4.3 (3.6 to 5.1) –8.043 <0.0001
All settings 8 1,702 7.7 (7.5 to 8.0)
Numbers affected per outbreak
Hospital 17   751 17.5 (16.4 to 18.5)
Residential facilities 23   723 21.5 (19.8 to 23.3) 4.895 <0.0001
School 24     73 24.9 (20.5 to 30.3) 3.594 <0.0001
Food outlet 23   104 23.4 (19.8 to 27.6) 3.444 0.001
Hotel 29   147 26.5 (23.0 to 30.6) 5.729 <0.0001
Other 29     74 24.5 (20.2 to 29.7) 3.432 0.001
All settings 21 1,872 20.3 (19.7 to 21.1)
aCI, confidence interval.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2003 75
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main factor linking at-risk populations. In other settings, liv-
ing, working, or recreational areas were shared by at-risk pop-
ulations for varying lengths of time, thus increasing the
opportunities for person-to-person spread. Even in those
instances where foodborne transmission initiated an outbreak
within a health-care institution, high levels of person-to-person
spread usually followed. Therefore, prolonged levels of con-
tact between persons in semi-closed institutions such as hospi-
tals, residential-care facilities, and schools facilitate person-to-
person spread to an extent not seen in other settings, which in
turn leads to more prolonged outbreaks. However, schools dif-
fer from health-care institutions in terms of the seasonality and
duration of NV outbreaks. In this respect, schools are more
like hotels, food outlets, and other settings.
The number of affected persons was smaller in hospital
outbreaks than in all other settings. This finding may reflect
the lack of a universally employed definition of the spatial
boundaries of an outbreak. In some hospitals, each unit
affected was reported as a separate outbreak, resulting in
smaller but more numerous outbreaks. In addition, cases that
occur in institutions are more easily recognized as part of an
outbreak than cases in open settings or the community. Thus,
smaller outbreaks occurring in open settings might not be rec-
ognized or reported to investigating agencies.
The peak in recorded outbreaks seen in the winter of 1995–
1996 can largely be seen as a consequence of enhanced sur-
veillance through the development of the Public Health Labo-
ratory Service electron microscopy network. However, there
are anecdotal reports of an increase in workload in these labo-
ratories, and other countries also recorded an increase in NV
activity during the same period (11). The steady increase of
reports from 1998 to 2000 may be due to increased awareness,
increasing use of the molecular diagnostics RT-PCR and
enzyme immunoassays, or a real increase in the occurrence of
outbreaks. 
Biases in different surveillance systems partly explain the
wide variation in estimates of the levels of foodborne trans-
mission in NV outbreaks. The data presented in this report
suggest foodborne transmission in 10% of outbreaks in
England and Wales. Estimates in Sweden (16%) (6), the Neth-
erlands (17%) (11), and the United States (40%) (3) were all
higher; however, figures from these countries are derived from
much smaller datasets. In the United States, foodborne out-
breaks were more likely to be reported because surveillance
may be focused on detecting foodborne outbreaks (3).
The data sources that contribute to a surveillance system
are a key factor affecting the estimate of the importance of
foodborne transmission. In England and Wales, surveillance is
broad-based and collects reports on outbreaks spread by all
modes of transmission from a range of public health profes-
sionals such as physicians, environmental health officers, and
diagnostic laboratories. By contrast, FoodNet, a U.S. network,
is designed to detect foodborne infections (29). Since hospitals
in England and Wales are in the public sector, they might be
expected to readily report outbreaks to the national surveil-
lance scheme. However, by this logic, residential homes
(which are privately operated) would not be expected to report
outbreaks since they might be under commercial pressures to
keep information on infection confidential. The fact that nearly
as many outbreak reports came from residential homes as from
hospitals in the survey period suggests that reporting predomi-
nantly from the public, not the private sector, is not the case.
The biases on a passive surveillance system are multiple and
cannot be expected to act in only one direction. 
The importance of NV as a cause of gastroenteritis out-
breaks in U.S. nursing homes has been demonstrated by Green
et al. (30), although the role of this virus in hospital settings
has not. Aside from bias, other reasons such as variability in
infection control practices in different health-care systems
could result in a real difference in the importance of foodborne
transmission or transmission in health-care facilities. Although
NV has been estimated to cause 67% of all such illness caused
by identified microbial agents (3), only 5% of public health
professionals considered this pathogen to be “one of the three
most common pathogens causing foodborne illness in the
United States” (31); this lack of awareness probably affects
outbreak investigation. 
The link between oysters and NV infection is well
described (32–35). These filter feeders become contaminated
during growth or transport in sewage-contaminated water (33),
unlike other food products that become contaminated by an
infected food handler or cross-contamination. However, oys-
ters were implicated as the vehicle of infection in <25% of the
foodborne outbreaks, and a wide range of other vehicles were
also reported. The greatest proportion of these outbreaks was
attributed to ready-to-eat foods contaminated by infected food
handlers. In the absence of a known zoonotic reservoir for
NVs, the main reservoir of infection appears to be humans.
Thus, reducing the incidence of foodborne NV infection
requires interventions designed to prevent infected persons
from contaminating prepared food and sewage from contami-
nating oyster beds. 
These data, which show NV as the causative agent in 36%
of outbreaks, support previous reports that NVs are the most
common cause of infectious intestinal diseases in industrial-
ized nations (6,11,20,36). NV accounts for a substantial extent
of disease and potential economic loss, particularly to the
health service where a large proportion of outbreaks occur.
Wider consequences include ward closure, delayed discharge,
and postponement of operations. Although NVs cause mild
symptoms in healthy adults, the consequences of infection in
vulnerable populations may be more serious. Considering that
the populations of developed countries are aging, ensuring
high levels of infection control in institutions caring for vul-
nerable groups is important.
Conclusions
These analyses demonstrate the value of maintaining stan-
dardized outbreak surveillance over an extended period. By
examining the epidemiologic characteristics of general out-RESEARCH
76 Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2003
breaks of NV by setting, we demonstrated that this pathogen
is not merely an extremely common cause of infectious intes-
tinal disease but that its effects vary widely according to the
population at risk. Within health-care institutions, NV con-
tributes to substantial illness and is associated with substantial
numbers of deaths. The elucidation of a distinct outbreak pat-
tern that is characteristic of health-care institutions suggests
that a combination of host, virologic, and environmental fac-
tors mediate these divergent epidemiologic patterns. Focused
research studies need to be developed to investigate the popu-
lation as well as the microbiologic and behavioral processes
that might explain these observations. In addition, population-
based studies incorporating virus typing are required to gain a
deeper understanding of the epidemiology of sporadic NV
infection in the wider population. Such studies are a prerequi-
site to the development of firm evidence-based and targeted
control strategies.
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Appendix. Surveillance and analysis definitions
Outbreak: an incident in which two or more people, thought to
have a common exposure, experience a similar illness or proven
infection, at least one of them being ill (22). 
General outbreak: an outbreak that affects members of more
than one household, or residents of an institution (36).
General outbreak of Norovirus: a general outbreak in which
Norovirus is determined to be the causative agent by electron micros-
copy, RT-PCR, or enzyme immunoassay in one or more affected per-
sons. 
Residential facilities: includes residential homes, which provide
some assistance in day-to-day living, and nursing homes, which pro-
vide care for persons whose infirmity or illness requires nursing care
on a regular basis.
Food outlets: commercial food retailers including restaurants,
pubs, bars, cafeterias, mobile food vendors, and caterers.
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